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Searching for a Sense of Control: The
Challenge Presented By Community
Conflicts Over Concentrated Animal
Feeding Operations
Nancy A. Welsh* and Barbara Gray**
I. Introduction
The growth in the number of concentrated animal feeding
operations ("CAFOs"), particularly those involved in swine production,
has brought with it increased community concern and outright conflict in
many communities across the United States.' Most commentators have
focused upon anticipated outcomes to explain the contentiousness of
CAFO-related disputes.2 Meanwhile, even though the social dynamics
that contribute to the development and escalation of conflicts over
* Associate Professor of Law and Associate Director of the Center for Dispute
Resolution, The Dickinson School of Law, The Pennsylvania State University; B.A.
magna cum laude, Allegheny College, 1979; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1982.
** Professor of Organizational Behavior and Director, Center for Research in
Conflict and Negotiation, Smeal College of Business, The Pennsylvania State University;
B.S. magna cum laude, University of Dayton, 1968; Ph.D., Organizational Behavior,
Case Western Reserve University, 1979.
1. See B. J. Hubbell and R. Welsh, An Examination of Trends in Geographic
Concentration in U.S. Hog Production, 30 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND APPLIED
ECONoMICs 285-99 (1998).
2. Particularly, commentators have focused on concerns regarding economic
viability, environmental contamination, and over-regulation. See e.g., D. L. Bartlett & J.
B. Steel, The Empire of Pigs, TIME, Nov. 30, 1998, at 52-64; A. Thurow, An
Industrializing Animal Agriculture: Challenges and Opportunities Associated with
Clustering, in PRIVATIZATION OF TECHNOLOGY AND INFORMATION TRANSFER IN THE U.S.
AGRICULTURE: RESEARCH AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (S. Wolf ed., 1997); J. E. Ikerd,
LARGE SCALE, CORPORATE HOG OPERATIONS: WHY RURAL COMMUNITIES ARE CONCERNED
AND WHAT THEY SHOULD DO (Sustainable Agriculture Systems Program, Univ. of Mo.,
Working Paper, 1998); U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-95-200BR,
ANIMAL AGRICULTURE: INFORMATION OF WASTE MANAGEMENT AND WATER QUALITY
ISSUES (Briefing report to the Committee on Agric., Nutrition, & Forestry, U.S. Senate,
June 1995).
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CAFOs parallel those exhibited in other kinds of community conflicts,
little research has systematically examined the social dynamics
associated with CAFO conflicts. One exception to this deficiency is
recent work conducted by a team of researchers that examined CAFO-
related disputes in Pennsylvania in order to make recommendations for
alternative models for the resolution of such disputes.4 The researchers
found that Pennsylvania stakeholders' perceived loss of direct and
indirect control in the decision-making processes governing CAFOs was
at the root of these conflicts.5 This Article highlights stakeholders'
concerns about the procedural fairness of the governmental decision-
making surrounding CAFOs, including the negotiation, passage, and
implementation of the Pennsylvania Nutrient Management Act ("Act 6");
decisions regarding CAFOs' requests for permits; and townships'
adoption of CAFO-related ordinances. The Article argues that these
perceptions of procedural unfairness are among the primary factors
contributing to Pennsylvania stakeholders' perception of loss of control.
Alternative mechanisms for the resolution of CAFO-related disputes,
therefore, must respond quite explicitly to the need for procedural justice.
In Part I, based on interviews with stakeholders in Pennsylvania,
this Article will describe the model of how conflicts over CAFOs arise
and will provide an overview of the stakeholders' perceptions regarding
uncertainty, risk, unfairness, threats to identity, and mistrust, and it will
demonstrate the effect of these cognitive and affective responses upon
perceptions of control. In Part II, the Article will explore the procedural
justice implications of the central issues of fairness, identity
maintenance, and trust, as well as stakeholders' preferences for more
productive resolution of CAFO-related conflicts. Finally, in Part III, the
Article will propose five community participation and dispute resolution
processes that have the potential to increase the reality and perception of
procedural justice for all members of the communities affected by
decision-making regarding CAFOs. The analysis in this Article is
intended to help policy makers, regulators, and the disputants themselves
3. See, e.g., W. GAMSON, THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL PROTEST 30-32 & 72-88
(1975); Edgar Schein, Intergroup Problems in Organizations, in ORGANIZATIONAL
PSYCHOLOGY 96-99 (David Kolb et al. eds., 2d ed 1970); M. SHERIF & C. SHERIF,
GROUPS IN HARMONY AND TENSION 105-8 (1966).
4. CHARLEs ABDALLA, JOHN BECKER, CELIA COOK-HUFFMAN, BARBARA GRAY &
NANCY WELSH, ALTERNATIVE CONFLICT RESOLUTION STRATEGIES FOR ADDRESSING
COMMUNITY CONFLICTS OVER INTENSIVE LIVESTOCK OPERATIONS: FINAL REPORT FOR
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE CONTRACT # ME 448432 [hereinafter
ABDALLA ET AL., PENNSYLVANIA REPORT]. See also, Charles Abdalla, John Becker,
Ralph Hanke, Celia Cook-Huffnan, Barbara Gray, and Nancy Welsh, Community
Conflicts Over Intensive Livestock Operations: How and Why Do Such Conflicts
Escalate?, 7 DRAKE J. OF AGRICULTURAL LAW (forthcoming) (2002).
5. Id.
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to anticipate the social dynamics of these conflicts and to make informed
choices about how to address them constructively.
II. Community Conflicts over CAFOs
In 1999-2000, Abdalla et al.6 conducted in-depth interviews with
Pennsylvania stakeholders who have been involved in CAFO-related
disputes, including local farmers, community activists,
environmentalists, representatives of agribusiness, and local, state, and
federal officials.7 Based on these interviews, Abdalla et al. proposed a
model of how conflicts over CAFOs arise. This Article begins with a
brief overview of this model before looking more closely at the
procedural justice issues embedded within it. Abdalla et al.'s model of
community conflicts over CAFOs focuses on the inter-relationships
between: 1) the stimuli that motivate people to become involved in the
conflict, 2) their cognitive and affective reactions to the conflict
(perceptions, feelings, interpretations, attributions, etc.), 3) their
subsequent perceptions regarding their direct or indirect control in the
situation, and 4) the actions they take based upon their interpretations
and perceptions. Figure 1 shows the four main steps in the model.9
Figure 1. The Four Main Steps Leading to How Conflicts Over CAFOs Arise
Actions Cognitive/Affective Judgment Response
Taken Reactions (B) (C) (D)
(A)
Uncertainty
Risk Perception P er in Conflict Behavior
Stimuli sDirm re Choice of
Perception of Indirect Venue






6. See supra note 4.
7. We conducted interviews with 28 stakeholders, including local farmers;
environmentalists; representatives of agribusiness; Farm Bureau representatives; local,
state, and federal officials; and concerned citizens, determined through a snowball
sampling procedure. See id.
8. See id. at 316-34.
9. See id.
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Initially, a stimulus or precipitating action occurs (see A in Figure 1),
such as the passage of a state or federal law regulating CAFOs, a
proposal for siting a CAFO in a community, or an incidence of
environmental damage from a particular site. The stimulus generates
responsive actions by other stakeholders that either fuel or circumvent
conflict.'o Although the model presents only one cycle of stimulus and
reaction, it is understood to be cumulative, occurring against an existing
backdrop of history and established relationships among the
stakeholders.
The stimulus triggers one (or more) of five critical cognitive or
affective reactions from concerned stakeholders (see B in Figure 1).
These cognitive reactions, alone or in combination, cause stakeholders to
experience perceptions of more or less control over the situation. The
interviews with Pennsylvania stakeholders revealed that they
experienced less control over the situation when (1) their perception of
uncertainty about the situation, including the legal, scientific and/or
economic issues implicated in the situation increased; (2) their
perception of the risk associated with CAFOs increased; (3) they
believed the actions taken by others were unfair; (4) an important aspect
of their own identity was threatened; and/or (5) their mistrust of other
parties increased."
Using portions of the interviews with stakeholders, this Article will
now briefly explain the underpinnings of stakeholders' perceptions
regarding uncertainty, risk, fairness, social identity, and trust.
A. Perceptions of Uncertainty and Risk
A stimulus or precipitating action (A in Figure 1) may either
increase or reduce the level of uncertainty an individual feels about a
situation, as well as how much risk the individual perceives as associated
with the situation. In Pennsylvania, one such stimulus was the
negotiation and passage of the Nutrient Management Act.12 This state
legislation, which became law in 1993, was intended to define the terms
for legitimate public decision-making regarding the impacts of manure
generated by CAFOs in Pennsylvania.' 3 The Act protects water quality
by requiring certain CAFOs to develop nutrient management plans and to
10. See id. at 18-19.
11. See id. at 19-32.
12. See id. at 18-19.
13. See The Pennsylvania Nutrient Management Act, 3 P.S. § 1702 (1999) ("The
purposes of this act are as follows: (1) To establish criteria, nutrient management
planning requirements and an implementation schedule for the application of nutrient
management measures on certain agricultural operations which generate or utilize animal
manure. . . .").
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operate in a manner consistent with those plans, once they are approved,
or face sanctions.14 The Act also pre-empts local government authority
to pass regulations or ordinances that are inconsistent with or more
stringent than the requirements of the Nutrient Management Act.'5
Because the Nutrient Management Act specifies precisely how
CAFO operators can achieve compliance with Pennsylvania's
environmental requirements, agribusinesses and farmers who wish to
build CAFOs have experienced an increased level of certainty regarding
their obligations in managing animal nutrients.16 For other stakeholders,
however, the new statute presents a confusing morass of information that
creates discomfort and uncertainty about what rights they have, how
enforcement will occur, and what is or is not covered by the law.17 This
confusion generates uncertainty regarding the protection provided by the
law and also appears to lead to a decreased sense of control for these
stakeholders, especially when they perceive that their efforts to clarify
the confusion produce little or no result.'8
As community activists in Pennsylvania discussed the concerns
triggered by the passage of Act 6, their comments centered around
perceptions of uncertainty regarding the safety of CAFO-generated
odors, the impact of state pre-emption of local authority to regulate
CAFOs, and the likelihood of enforcement of environmental
regulations.' 9  For example, one community stakeholder said,
"Pennsylvania's Nutrient Management legislation has some pre-emptive
language which has left a lot of questions in the minds of people as to
what rights they really do have . . . . . A lot of municipalities are just
struggling with this thing as to what they're legally allowed to do." 20
Others noted:
Here is a new program to oversee these large operations to require a
permit, and nobody knows where to call to get the answers for
that ... . You're supposed to go to the regional offices to get your
answers and the regions haven't been trained on it yet. They don't
know what the answers are. People are calling conservation districts
that don't have authority under that for knowing what the answers
14. See id. at § 1706, 1711-12.
15. See id at § 1717. See also Michael Meloy, An Overview of Nutrient
Management Requirements in Pennsylvania, 10 Penn St. Envtl. L. Rev. 249 (2002).
16. See ABDALLA ET AL., PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 4 at 19. It should be
noted, however, that agribusinesses and farmers experience uncertainty in other areas.
See id. at 18-21.
17. See id. at 18-21.
18. Seeidat2l.
19. See id.
20. Id. at 20.
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21are.
We require the [state agency] to get the answers on that. They don't
know. They don't know where to go to get the answers themselves.
There is no recognized regulatory authority for agriculture and how
this relates to agriculture . . . [w]ater consumption . . . nobody knows
where to go for that. Do you go to SRBC for that? Do you go to [a
state agency]? And it's very confused about what to do for water
consumption. 2
Consistent with studies of risk perception,2 3 different Pennsylvania
stakeholders demonstrated distinctively different assessments of the level
of risk presented by CAFOs. Most important was the difference between
the perceptions of technical and lay observers. Previous studies have
found that the former focus more on expected risks while the latter
emphasize extreme possibilities.24 For community members who were
concerned about the potential long-term health effects of the odors
associated with CAFOs, perceptions of risk were quite high. In the
words of one stakeholder:
The first thing I did was I went to the medical literature to see
whether they really did represent a risk. Despite what the CAFO
operators say and despite what everyone else says, the literature in
the scientific community is pretty well established that these things
do represent a substantial risk, environmentally and from a lot of
other perspectives; particularly some of the research that has been
done in Europe is rather compelling. 25
Farmers too indicated that the current situation in Pennsylvania
involved risks, but the farmers focused primarily upon the economic risk
of not being permitted to operate CAFOs:
You [have] got this farmer that built this building, and has this
mortgage, and if that thing is empty, they've lost. The building is
worthless. The land doesn't sell for more, a lot more, just because it
has a building on it. There is no return on that thing short of growing
birds .... They're [the farmers] taking a lot of the risk .... They
21. Id. at 21.
22. Id. at 14.
23. See, e.g., M. Elliott, The Effect of Differing Assessments of Risk in Hazardous
Waste Facility Siting Negotiations 6-8 (unpublished manuscript, Ga. Inst. of Tech.)
(1988); Gregory Fischer, M. Granger Morgan, Baruch Fischoff, Indira Nair, & Lester B.
Lave, What Risks Are People Concerned About?, 11 RISK ANALYsIS 303, 309-10 (1991).
24. See Elliott, supra note 23 at 6-8.
25. ABDALLA ET AL., PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 4 at 8.
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feel vulnerable. 26
B. Perceptions of Unfairness and Threats to Identity
A stimulus or precipitating action also triggers perceptions
regarding fairness, and it can pose a threat to particular stakeholders'
social identity (e.g., as farmers, environmentalists, community members,
or even citizens). When people believe that they (or their social group)
have been treated disadvantageously, i.e., unfairly, in relation to other
groups, they are less willing to accept existing social policy and more
inclined to take legal action and engage in protest.27 Fairness concerns or
identity threats often provoke conflict or exacerbate already existing
conflictual relationships. Examples of this dynamic can be found in the
environmental justice movement, for instance, in which African-
Americans have been spurred to protest over the disproportionate
number of toxic sites in their communities.
The interviews with Pennsylvania stakeholders revealed that nearly
all stakeholder groups perceived themselves as being treated unfairly
and/or that their social identity was under attack.29 Community activists
and environmentalists insisted that they had not been allowed to play a
meaningful role in decision-making at the state level. Meanwhile,
agribusiness representatives and local farmers indicated that local
government officials were treating them unfairly by passing new
ordinances to regulate CAFOs. All of these stakeholders perceived a
lack of respect for their rights and roles as valuable members of
communities and as citizens in a democracy. These perceptions of
unfairness and threats to social identity are significant, and the Article
will return to them in Part II.
C. Perceptions of Mistrust
Finally, a stimulus or precipitating action may generate an increase
or reduction in the level of trust that one stakeholder group feels toward
other stakeholders in the dispute. Trust arises when parties can rely on
26. Id.
27. See Kelly Mollica & Barbara Gray, Layoff Survivors Become Layoff Victims:
Propensity to Litigate, 24 HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 4-5 (2001); GAMSON, supra
note 3 at 193-4. See also Craig McEwen & Richard Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims
Court: Achieving Compliance Through Consent, 18 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 11 (1984);
Nancy Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What's Justice Got to Do
With It?, 79 WASH. U. LAW. Q. 1, 819-20 (2001).
28. See R. D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS AND ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY 10-20 (1990).
29. See ABDALLA ET AL., PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 4 at 24-27.
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others to fulfill their expectations; conversely, mistrust arises when a
violation of one's expectations about another's expected behavior
occurs.30  Classic research on intergroup relations has shown that
ruptures in trust are difficult to repair because competing groups develop
stereotypes of each other as the enemy and engage in selective listening
that reinforces those stereotypes.
The interviews with Pennsylvania stakeholders revealed substantial
perceptions of mistrust.32  Most dramatic was mistrust toward
governmental agencies, which were perceived as, at best, incapable of
fulfilling their responsibilities and, at worst, biased and not committed to
protecting the welfare of all affected stakeholders.3 3 This perception will
be examined in greater detail in Part II.
D. The Effect of Cognitive and Affective Perceptions
Collectively, these cognitive and affective reactions play a key role
in the progression of conflicts over CAFOs. The reactions in Step 2 lead
an individual or a group to reach a critical judgment in Step 3 regarding
the degree to which they are able to exercise control, direct or indirect,
over the situation (see C in Figure 1). The individual stakeholder or
group exercises direct control when there will be no outcome unless the
individual or the group agrees to such an outcome. In contrast, the
individual stakeholder or group exercises indirect control if they can
influence the outcome or provide input that will be considered by the
decision-maker. Stakeholders whose cognitive or affective reactions are
negative (feel threatened, distrustful, etc.) are likely to feel that they have
little control, either direct or indirect, over their situation.
Stakeholders' behavior in Step 4 of the model (see D in Figure 1)
stems directly from their perceived ability (or lack thereof) to exert
control over the situation. Loss of self-efficacy and control leaves people
feeling extremely vulnerable and provokes self-protective, defensive
behavior.34 Thus, it affects the extent to which they become mobilized in
the conflict and the mechanisms they select to pursue their goals. The
less control they perceive they have, the more likely they will be to
engage in some form of conflict behavior in order to protect or restore
their own sense of well-being and control. And, if they believe they have
been denied any meaningful level of control in the traditional decision-
30. See R. Bhattacharya, T. M. Devinney & M. M. Pillutla, A Formal Model of Trust
Based on Outcomes, 23 ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW 459-72 (1998).
31. See SHERIF, supra note 3 at 194-5.
32. See ABDALLA ET AL., PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 4 at 27-29.
33. See id.
34. See JAY ROTHMAN, RESOLVING IDENTITY-BASED CONFLICT 7-13 (1997).
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making process, they will be more likely to select an alternative forum in
which to raise their concerns and effect change. In Pennsylvania, this
dynamic helps to explain why disgruntled stakeholders have pressed
township boards to adopt anti-CAFO ordinances, have engaged in
boycotts, and have even committed acts of violence. On the other
hand, stakeholders who perceive themselves as having a high degree of
control are unlikely to feel any need to seek alternative forums or take
protective actions that might lead to conflict.
While all five cognitive and affective factors affect the degree to
which CAFO stakeholders perceive they have control over the issues in
CAFO conflicts, the remainder of the Article will focus on the three
affective and cognitive reactions regarding fairness, identity, and trust
and their relationship to procedural justice research and theories.
III. Procedural Justice and Its Relationship to the Perceptions of
Pennsylvania Stakeholders
A. A Brief Overview of the Procedural Justice Literature
Often, fairness or justice is defined in terms of the substantive
fairness of a decision ("distributive justice"). Equally important is the
fairness of the procedure used for reaching the decision ("procedural
justice").36 Indeed, a significant body of research in psychology, law and
management has been devoted to the concept of procedural justice. 37
Significantly, this research has shown that fair procedures affect
perceptions of distributive justice and, indeed, can mitigate unfair
outcomes.38  Applying this finding to community conflicts, if citizens
believe that an authority's decision-making process was procedurally
just, they are more likely to conclude that the process produced a
substantively just result.39  Further, an authority's decision-making
procedures, by themselves, strongly influence whether citizens Will
35. See ABDALLA ET AL., PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 4 at 7.
36. See Morton Deutsch, Justice and Conflict, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 41-42 (Morton Deutsch & Peter Coleman eds., 2000) (discussing
distributive justice, procedural justice, a "sense of justice," retributive or reparative
justice, and the scope of justice).
37. See J. Thibaut & L. Walker, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
APPROACH (1975); G. S. Levinthal, What Should Be Done With Equity Theory? New
Approaches to the Study of Fairness in Social Relationships, in SOCIAL EXCHANGE:
ADVANCES IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 27-55 (Kenneth Gergen, M.S. Greenberg & R. H.
Willis eds., 1980); E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988).
38. See Lind & Tyler, supra note 37 at 66-70, 205.
39. See id.
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comply with the authority's decisions.4 0  To the extent that citizens
perceive that the decision-making procedures are fair, citizens are more
likely to comply with the decisions reached through those procedures,
even when the decisions are disadvantageous to them.41 Additionally,
perceptions of procedural justice affect whether citizens judge the
decision maker's authority to be legitimate.42
Because perceptions of procedural justice are so influential,
decision makers should consider what procedural "markers" matter.
Citizens base their assessment of the procedural fairness of governmental
decision-making on four process characteristics: 1) Opportunity for
voice (i.e., Was the citizen given the opportunity to tell her story and to
control the telling of that story?);43 2) Consideration (i.e., Did the
authority demonstrate that s/he had considered the citizen's story?);" 3)
Even-handed treatment (i.e., Did the authority demonstrate that s/he was
trying to be fair and even-handed?); 4 5 and 4) Dignity and respect (i.e.,
Did the authority treat the citizen with dignity and respect?) 46
Importantly and perhaps surprisingly, research has found that citizens'
perceptions of fairness are influenced as much 4 7 or more4 8 by their
40. See E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, Disputing and Reactions to Legal
Authorities, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 185-91 (Austin Sarat et al.
eds., 1998); T. R. Tyler & P. Degoey, Conflict Restraint in Social Dilemmas: Procedural
Justice and Identification Effects on Support for Authorities, 69 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 493 (1995).
41. See McEwen & Maiman, supra note 27 at 44-45.
42. See Lind & Tyler, supra note 37 at 209; Lind, Procedural Justice, Disputing and
Reactions to Legal Authorities, supra note 38 at 185-91; Tyler & Degoey, supra note 40
at 493.
43. See Lind & Tyler, supra note 37 at 101-04.
44. Id. at 236.
45. See Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Models of the Justice Motive: Antecedents of
Distributive and Procedural Justice, 67 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 850, 853
(1994).
46. See Lind & Tyler, supra note 37 at 214, E. ALLAN LIND ET AL., THE PERCEPTION
OF JUSTICE: TORT LITIGANTS' VIEWS OF TRIAL, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION, AND
JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES 66 (1989).
47. See P. Christopher Earley & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice and Participation
in Task Selection: The Role of Control in Mediating Justice Judgments, 52 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1148, 1154 (1987); Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Models
of the Justice Motive, supra note 45 at 859 (finding that "both decision and process
control mattered" in the legal arena while decision control mattered less in the managerial
setting).
48. See Stephen LaTour et al., Procedure: Transnational Perspectives and
Preferences, 86 YALE L.J. 258, 283 (1976) (finding that United States "participants prefer
to control the process of evidence presentation themselves while a third party controls the
result); E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants' Evaluations of
Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 953, 965 (1990)
(reporting that litigants perceived trial and arbitration as fairer than bilateral settlements
or judicial settlement conferences).
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process control than by their control over the ultimate decision.49
Together, two theories help to explain the profound importance of
voice, consideration, and even-handed, dignified treatment. First, the
opportunity to express one's views permits citizens to influence the final
outcome of decision-making or dispute resolution processes.50  This
opportunity for voice reassures citizens that the final decision will be
fully informed and increases the likelihood that it will be substantively
fair. Citizens are able to conclude that they have thus exercised indirect,
yet meaningful, control over the final decision. Indeed, some scholars
theorize that perceptions of procedural fairness represent a heuristic, or
mental shortcut, for assessments of substantive fairness.5 1 Second,
citizens use procedural "markers" to judge whether they can trust that the
decision-maker respects them and will try to be fair. The decision-maker
is an authority who represents the larger society. When the authority
manages the process so that citizens feel heard and respected, this signals
to the citizens that they are acknowledged as valued members of
society. 52 The citizens' loss of direct control over the final outcome thus
becomes less worrisome. "If people are able to infer a benevolent
disposition, they can trust that in the long run the authority with whom
they are dealing will work to serve their interests."53 In contrast, when
the procedural attributes described above are absent, the authority sends
the message that society considers these citizens to be undeserving or
inferior. Consequently, trusting the fairness of the society's decision-
makers, their processes, and the outcomes of those processes becomes
more difficult.
Because procedures have such influence upon citizens' perceptions
of substantive fairness and legitimacy, as well as the likelihood of their
compliance, some decision-makers may be tempted to cloak intended
unfairness in procedural niceties. Others may pledge to citizens that their
49. See e.g., E. Allan Lind et al., Voice, Control, and Procedural Justice:
Instrumental and Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments, 59 J. PERSONALITY
& Soc. PSYCHOL. 952, 957 (1990) (finding that people's fairness judgments are enhanced
by the opportunity to voice their opinions even when this opportunity does not occur until
after a decision has been made; having a "voice with the possibility of influence . .. leads
to even greater perceived fairness); Tom Tyler et al., Influence of Voice on Satisfaction
with Leaders: Exploring the Meaning of Process Control, 48 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 72, 80 (1985) (based on field study and laboratory studies, concluding that
voice heightens procedural justice judgments and leadership endorsement even when
disputants perceive that they have little control over the decision).
50. See Lind, Procedural Justice, Disputing and Reactions to Legal Authorities,
supra note 40 at 179.
51. See id. at 177, 185.
52. See id. at 182; Tyler, Psychological Models of the Justice Motive, supra note 45
at 852.
53. Tyler, Psychological Models of the Justice Motive, supra note 45 at 854.
3052002]
PENN STATE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
voice will influence the decision-making process when, in fact, the
decision-makers do not intend to be influenced. The procedural justice
literature suggests that citizens are aware of their vulnerability to
intentional and unintentional manipulation and, if they perceive any
evidence of unfair treatment or perceive "false representations of fair
treatment[,]" they respond with "extremely negative reactions."5 4 Thus,
the temptation to engage in proceedings that could be characterized as
"sham" carries a high potential cost, in terms of triggering both severe
mistrust and doubts regarding the legitimacy of public officials and
institutions.
B. The Procedural Justice Implications of Stakeholders' Perceptions
Regarding Unfairness, Threats to Social Identity and Mistrust
Concerns regarding procedural justice appear to underlie many of
the affective and cognitive perceptions of the Pennsylvania stakeholders
who have been involved in CAFO-related disputes. Virtually every
stakeholder group in Pennsylvania raised doubts regarding governmental
authorities' real consideration of all stakeholders' voices and the
authorities' commitment to behaving in a fair and even-handed manner.
For example, as the following quote illustrates, many of the community
activists and environmentalists who objected to the unfairness of the
regulatory scheme established by the Nutrient Management Act
perceived that they had never been given a real opportunity for voice in
the state or, federal decision-making processes governing CAFOs or in
the changes occurring in their communities as a result.55  They also
perceived that state officials were not treating them in an even-handed
and fair manner:
It was clear that at a federal and state level, there are so many people
giving lip service to protecting the family farm, protecting the
environment, regulating these industries and it's all hogwash. The
industry is well entrenched with the politicians and the farm laws are
designed to protect the corporate farms and there is no question about
that. That was disgusting and it was very clear that if anything was
going to be done politically, we had to do it at a grassroots level.
That's where it had to happen. 56
54. E. Allen Lind, Procedural Justice, Disputing and Reactions to Legal Authorities,
supra note 40 at 187. See Tom Tyler et al., Influence of Voice on Satisfaction with
Leaders, supra note 49 at 74 (explaining that under certain conditions, voice without
decision control heightens feelings of procedural injustice and dissatisfaction with
leaders, a result described as the "frustration effect").
55. See ABDALLA ET AL., PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 4 at 16, 24-25.
56. Id. at 13.
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State pre-emption of local government authority to regulate CAFOs
particularly led community members to perceive that they had been
denied meaningful voice and even-handed, fair treatment. One such
community member declared, "[O]ur rights are being taken away very
much. We don't even get a vote on it. Nobody is getting a vote on this
piggery. Nobody at all has a vote."5 7
Meanwhile, agribusiness representatives and farmers also perceived
that governmental decision-makers were not giving them voice,
consideration, and even-handed treatment. These stakeholders, however,
focused upon local government officials who they perceived as ignoring
the Nutrient Management Act's provisions regarding pre-emption. As
the next three quotes demonstrate, farmers and agribusiness
representatives expressed skepticism regarding these authorities' fairness
and even-handedness because they saw the townships as trying to change
the "rules of the game:"5 8
[T]wo townships passed township ordinances which are illegal. They
are definitely contrary to Act 6. They are going beyond Act 6, which
they are not allowed to do ... illegal, plain and simple .... Well it's
frustrating to me that we have regulations passed by the Senate and
the House that deal with farm rules, and [education about] Act 6, and
how things work and this is the way it is supposed to be. A township
cannot put an ordinance in place that is contrary to that ... .59
[B]ut the worst of it is that the townships are putting regulations in, a
couple that they know are not correct. Especially Nutrient
Management. And they are sitting there smiling waiting for someone
to sue them. We know that as a fact ... even though we have the
Nutrient Management law in this state. It's being violated, being
violated a lot.60
There is no question about it. They're illegal. But yet they pass them
and then they say, "Well, let's see if they're [challenged] or not.
Let's see if anyone has the guts to challenge us. Well, how are we
supposed to challenge them when we have township ordinances
passed?61
Stakeholders come into these conflicts with a specific set of
expectations for their elected and appointed government officials.
Citizens expect public officials to help them, to protect their interests, to
57. Id. at 24.
58. See id. at 24-26, 27-29.
59. Id. at 24-25.
60. ABDALLA ET AL., PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 4 at 29.
61. Id. at 29.
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be responsive to their concerns, to follow the statutes and regulations that
have been established, and to be honest in their dealings with
constituents. When these expectations are not perceived as met, group
members feel a sense of violation regarding who they are and their right
62as citizens to have a voice in public decision-making. As noted above,
for some stakeholders mistrust was kindled by their perceptions that
government personnel were not acting even-handedly and were, instead,
aligning themselves with farming interests (by giving preferential
treatment to certain nutrient management plans and/or acting as
advocates of CAFOs), or with community activists' interests (by
adopting ordinances that were viewed as violating the pre-emption
provisions of the Nutrient Management Act), rather than protecting and
responding to the interests and concerns of all citizens.
Stakeholders on both sides of the CAFO issue also perceived that
even when public officials gave them an opportunity to "tell their story,"
they were not treated with dignity or respect and their concerns were de-
legitimized:
You know, I subjected myself to that for what? Because when I
came back ... a positive thing I thought I was doing, to show that I
wasn't a big corporate executive, that I cared about the community. I
am not going to sit down there and say I don't care, to come up and
spend practically seven, eight hours at a meeting . .. and this is what
you get?63
It is very frustrating when dealing with these systems, when you have
people that are complaining of real health problems or perceived
changes. They are seeing them and, essentially, they are being called
liars because the studies have not been done, so it must be your
imagination. But, "Oh, by the way, no, we don't know because we
haven't done any work to monitor ourselves."6
Perceptions of de-legitimization and disrespect from other
stakeholders often pose a threat to people's salient social identity.65
Social identity refers to that part of an individual's sense of self that
comes from his or her affiliation with particular groups (e.g., community
member, activist, farmer, farm advocate, environmentalist, citizen, etc.).
Generally, social identity provides a source of structure and security that
reinforces group members' sense of belonging, their confidence in their
62. See id at 26.
6 3. Id.
64. Id. at 13-14.
65. See H. Tajfel & J. C. Turner,. The Social Identity Theory ofIntergroup Behavior,
in PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 7-24 (S. Worschel & W.G. Austin eds.,
1986).
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voice,'66 and, we suggest, their confidence that they will be heard in a
prescribed venue. Consequently, threats to salient social identities
often evoke strong protective responses.68  Repeatedly, the interviews
revealed that stakeholders believed that their identities as citizens in a
democracy and as valued members of communities were threatened:
The crux of the whole thing: Do we live in America or do we live in
the Soviet Union where the government says this is how it will be
and be damned with who doesn't agree? We should have been given,
according to the DEP plans, a public hearing, which never occurred.
At least it was never formally said that there was a public hearing.
We went up and bitched at our [township] supervisor, but they just
sat there and said there is nothing we can do, and that was basically a
lie.69
Whatever happens the farmer who is contemplating putting in a
CAFO begins to feel like an outsider. He was once a part of a
community; all of a sudden because of something he is contemplating
he no longer belongs to the community. It may have him giving
second thoughts as to what he needs to do farming wise to expand his
operation.70
The local farmer depending on the level of citizen activism is also
confused because he still sees this as a part of traditional farming and
cannot understand why the community he has belonged to all his life
is resisting his need to expand his farming operations.
Conflicts over CAFOs can force community members to redefine
their identities and can even create animosities among long time allies.72
In some circumstances, these cleavages are so wrenching that they
produce immobilization rather than mobilization. People withdraw from
the process completely rather than endure the derision of their neighbors.
In summary, concerns regarding procedural justice emerged as one
of the repeated themes in our interviews. All stakeholder groups
expressed disappointment regarding their inability to be heard in
decision-making processes, to receive consideration from the authorities,
66. See id at 15-16.
67. See GAMSON, supra note 3 at 30-32.
68. See ROTHMAN, supra note 34 at 7-13, BARBARA GRAY & RALPH HANKE, FRAME
REPERTOIRES AND COLLABORATIVE AND NON-COLLABORATIVE BEHAVIOR IN INTRACTABLE
ENVIRONMENTAL DisPuTEs 6 (Ctr. for Research in Conflict and Negotiation, Pa. St.
Univ.) (2001).
69. ABDALLA ET AL., PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 4 at 26.
70. Id. at 27.
7 1. Id.
72. See id at 15-16.
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and to be treated with fairness, dignity, and respect. Environmentalists,
agribusiness representatives, local farmers, government officials, and
community members consistently objected that governmental decision-
making procedures had failed to provide real consideration of their
interests, needs, and concerns. The Pennsylvania stakeholders'
perceptions that their voices had been ignored helps to explain much of
their skepticism regarding the substantive fairness of governmental
decision-making regarding CAFOs, their lack of trust in public officials,
and their perceptions that their social identities were seriously threatened.
Figure 2





* Dignity & respect
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In Figure 2, the model presented in Figure 1 is expanded to show how
differences in procedures can affect stakeholders' perceptions of fairness
and how fairness, in turn, affects trust and threats to identity. Arrow A
indicates whether a decision or action is perceived as distributively fair.
Arrow B shows the direct effect of the decision making process or
procedures upon fairness perceptions. Arrow C indicates that procedures
also ameliorate any perceptions of distributive justice that may have been
caused by the initial stimuli.73 Arrows D and E indicate that fairness
perceptions also affect perceptions of trust among the parties and
whether stakeholders perceive threats to their identities, as discussed
supra. All three of these perceptions, as well as the perceptions of risk
and uncertainty shown in Figure 1, ultimately affect how much control
stakeholders believe they have. The revised model in Figure 2 shows
that when stakeholders judge that the process of decision-making is
unfair, they are likely to: 1) perceive the situation as unfair; 2) perceive
that their identity is threatened; and 3) experience distrust of authorities.
Consequently, the stakeholders experience less control--either direct or
indirect-over a situation in which legal and scientific uncertainties have
already left them feeling vulnerable and at risk.
When people feel they have no recourse to ensure that their views
will be heard or to effect change, they will either resort to another, more
trusted forum for dispute resolution, through conflict mobilization and/or
74
non-traditional forums, or they will withdraw entirely from the process.
The breadth and depth of stakeholders' procedural justice concerns in
federal, state, and local CAFO-related decision-making in Pennsylvania
strongly suggests a need to find alternative dispute resolution and
decision-making processes that respond to stakeholders' concerns.
In our interviews, stakeholders' yearning for procedural justice and
some form of control were reiterated when we asked them to identify
their criteria for the successful resolution of disputes over CAFOs. The
stakeholders frequently and strongly expressed preferences for processes
that would produce outcomes responding to all stakeholders' interests
and inspire both compliance and ongoing collaboration.75 For example:
I think that success is when the two parties involved can both live
with the arrangement. Where each person comes away feeling like
they've gained something from the experience. Maybe they haven't
gotten everything they've wanted but they've gained from the
experience and their losses have been minimized.
73. This is treated mathematically as a moderating effect.
74. See GAMSON, supra note 3 at 30-32.
75. See ABDALLA ET AL., PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 4 at 33-36.
76. Id. at 35.
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That there is a permanent ongoing dialogue between the producers,
the Department of Ag[riculture], Department of Environmental
Protection. Not just created for initial, but for an ongoing
institutionalized arrangement. Each and every one is kept informed
of changes and movements in animal agriculture in the
Commonwealth.7
To a lesser but still significant extent, stakeholders also associated
"successful" resolution with respectful procedures that promote real
dialogue.78  One stakeholder observed: "How would you know that
disputes have been handled more successfully? Well, if every proposal
doesn't threaten to launch World War III that would be some progress." 79
Other expressions of the need for respectful dialogue were less colorful
but equally heartfelt:
I think they would be more willing to bring the parties together and
try to find ways to solve issues, if they think that it would be
productive .... [T]hey say, "These public meetings are non-
productive a waste of my time.". . . Nobody's ready to listen, and
you are not going to change anybody's mind in that situation. It is
such a shame.80
I think you can find remarkable contrast in how issues are resolved
based on how elected officials at the municipal and county level deal
with the issue .... The most successful ones in our experience seem
to be those that are able to forge some true collaborated response
within the limiting frameworks of our statute .... So where you are
able to bring the bodies to the table, give them the clear
understanding of your limitations and prerogatives, give them clear
understanding of their voice or give them a genuine voice to the
greatest extent you are permitted by law and the practicalities of the
process, we tend to achieve outcomes that are more harmonious in
the community than antagonistic. Particularly that's in contrast to the
ones where one side feels ignored or feels pushed away from the
table. 81
As the earlier discussion of the procedural justice literature reveals,
decision-making and dispute resolution processes that provide a real
opportunity for disputants to feel heard and that treat disputants with
dignity and respect have the effect of producing outcomes that are more
likely to be perceived as substantively just and that inspire greater
77. Id. at 36.
78. See id. at 35-36.
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compliance and finality. In focusing on the need for civility and real
dialogue, the stakeholders invoked the need for real voice accompanied
by real consideration and a willingness to be open to fairly assess the
concerns and arguments made by all stakeholders. Real dialogue also
suggests an acknowledgment of all stakeholders' place in the discussion
and their value in the dispute resolution or decision-making process and
to society as a whole.
The stakeholders also specifically identified the process
characteristics they considered important in resolving CAFO-related
disputes.82 Many of these process characteristics echo procedural justice
considerations. For example, many stakeholders expressed a preference
for processes that allow:
* The participants and constituents to trust in the honesty of the
process;
* The participants and constituents to trust that the outcomes of the
process will be truly considered and/or implemented by
government agencies;
* Inclusion of all viewpoints;
* Two-way discussion and dialogue; and
* Fair, inclusive outcomes. 8 3
To a large extent, procedural justice considerations also were
reflected in stakeholders' preferences regarding third parties. If
processes required the involvement of third parties, the stakeholders
sought individuals who were neutral, impartial, and trusted by all sides.84
Of course, these characteristics would be important to ensure that all
stakeholders felt heard and treated in an even-handed, respectful manner.
Stakeholders also wanted third parties to:
* Exercise control over communication;
* Keep the process moving and on track;
* Ask good questions;
* Allow all parties to have a voice; and
* Listen effectively.8 5
Stakeholders' preferences regarding process and third party
characteristics, however, also acknowledged the legal and scientific
complexity of CAFO-related disputes and the extent to which different
stakeholders rely on different and inconsistent information. Many
stakeholders wanted to be sure that alternative processes offered access
to relevant, accurate information and enabled informed decisions. Of
82. See id. at 36-37.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 37.
85. See id.
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course, this preference for decision-making based on full information is
consistent with the procedural justice literature described supra.
In describing their preferences regarding third parties, however,
stakeholders identified some characteristics and functions that have the
potential to undermine the perceived procedural justice of alternative
decision-making and dispute resolution procedures. Particularly, the
stakeholders expressed a preference for third parties who were
knowledgeable about CAFO-related issues and who would:
* Educate the parties;
* Make and provide judgments about what is relevant and/or
truthful; and
86* Provide advice to the parties.
Procedures that honor these preferences have the potential to undermine
perceptions of procedural justice in several ways. For example, if a third
party is knowledgeable about CAFO-related issues and his/her role
includes educating the parties or providing advice to the parties, this may
necessarily mean that the third party will express views that are
consistent with one stakeholder group's perspective and inconsistent with
another's. In this case, questions about the legitimacy of the third party
will likely be raised.87 Legitimacy issues arise when the third party and
the process s/he facilitates are not perceived to treat all of the
stakeholders in an even-handed and fair manner. If a third party's role
includes making and providing judgments about the truthfulness of a
stakeholder's presentation, the third party may be perceived as failing to
demonstrate genuine consideration of that stakeholder's voice. Research
suggests that these evaluative interventions may be consistent with
perceptions of procedural justice, but only if the third party exercises
restraint in the use of evaluation.89  The third party's evaluative
interventions should occur only after a meaningful opportunity for voice
and after s/he has clearly demonstrated consideration of what was said.
Any evaluation also should be expressed in a respectful, even-handed
manner.90 Use of the third party's knowledge and ability to advise has to
be managed very carefully because the need for procedurally just
processes is so clear.
86. See id.
87. See BARBARA GRAY, COLLABORATING: FINDING COMMON GROUND FOR
MULTIPARTY PROBLEMS 70-72 (1989).
88. See id.
89. See Welsh, supra note 27 at 846-51 (examining the impact of evaluative
interventions in court-connected mediation upon participants' perceptions of procedural
justice).
90. See id. at 849-50.
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IV. A Proposal for Processes that Respond to Stakeholders' Concerns
Regarding Procedural Justice and a Sense of Control
Because stakeholders' perceptions of lack of control appear to be so
related to their perceptions of lack of procedural justice in current
decision-making and dispute resolution process and because these
perceptions are exacerbated by stakeholders' perceptions of uncertainty
and risk arising out of the legal and scientific complexity of CAFO-
related disputes, any proposal for alternative forums must respond
directly to these identified problems. Any proposal must also
acknowledge that CAFO-related conflicts are triggered by very different
stimuli (e.g., a proposal to site a CAFO, a township's consideration of a
proposed ordinance, a state agency's response to complaints regarding
the operation of a facility) and invoke different decision-making contexts
(e.g., local government decision-making regarding a proposed permit, a
conservation district's decision-making regarding a proposed nutrient
management plan, a state agency's decision-making regarding a CAFO's
compliance with environmental requirements).91  These different
contexts can require different emphasis in responding to the need for
procedural justice and for education regarding complex legal and
scientific questions. Therefore, this Article will not propose just one
alternative process to respond to all of the situations in which CAFO-
related disputes arise. Rather, the Article will recommend consideration
of five different processes and suggest the ways in which implementation
of the processes will determine their actual responsiveness to
stakeholders' concerns.
The five recommended processes are: public information meetings,
formal review and comment, formal public hearings, consensus-seeking
processes, and mediation.92 As illustrated in Figure 3, the first three
processes, also described generally as "community participation"
processes, focus upon community education and/or the opportunity for
the expression of voice but do not aim directly for resolution. The last
two processes, also described generally as "dispute resolution" processes,
focus upon providing an opportunity for voice and the achievement of
consensus and commitment to a solution. Only the last dispute
resolution process, mediation, provides all stakeholders with the
opportunity to exercise direct control over the decision making process.
91. See JOHN BECKER, CHARLES ABDALLA, NANCY WELSH, BARBARA GRAY & CELIA
COOK-HUFFMAN, A GUIDEBOOK ON COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN ADDRESSING DISPUTES
OVER INTENSIVE LIVESTOCK OPERATIONS 53-92 (2000) (describing the application of
relevant laws and potential use of community participation and dispute resolution
processes in various contexts).
92. See ABDALLA ET AL., PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 4 at 38-39.
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The first four processes, in contrast, provide increasing degrees of
indirect control through the expression and consideration of voice. Each
of the recommended procedures is described briefly below, with
suggestions for implementation to ensure their responsiveness to the
need for procedural justice.
Figure 3. Recommended Processes
( Public Formal Formal Consensus
Info Review & Public Seeking Mediation
Meeting Comment Hearing Process
A. Community Participation Processes
1. Public Information Meetings
This process provides an opportunity for all interested citizens to be
educated about a proposed land use (such as a CAFO) or a decision
related to a proposed land use that a township board or other agency
must make. Information regarding complex issues of law, science, and
technology can be raised and discussed. Although anyone can organize a
public information meeting, government agencies often hold such
meetings to help citizens become informed.93 The agencies generally
determine the identity of the presenters and the issues that will be
discussed. The focus in this process is clearly upon education and this
may be conceived as one-way communication, 9 4 from the presenters to
the stakeholders sitting in the audience. Structured in this way, public
meetings offer stakeholders little opportunity for voice. Indeed, when
stakeholders speak, they often are perceived, and may intend to be
perceived, as disruptive. Public information meetings have the potential,
however, to permit voice. For example, representative stakeholders may
be invited to consult with the sponsoring agency to determine the timing
93. See PUBLIC ISSUES EDUCATION: INCREASING COMPETENCE IN RESOLVING PUBLIC
ISSUES 22-23 (D. D. Dale & A. J. Hahn eds., 1994) (Pub. Educ. Materials Task Force of
the Nat'l Pub. Pol'y Educ. Conn. & PLC & PODC subcomm. of the Extension Comm.
on Org. & Pol'y, Univ. of Wis.-Extension). See also JAMES CREIGHTON, INVOLVING
CITIzENs IN COMMUNITY DECISION MAKING: A GUIDEBOOK 30-38 (1992).
94. See PUBLIC ISSUES EDUCATION, supra note 93 at 23; Creighton, supra note 93 at
11, 111-17.
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of such meetings, the issues to be discussed, the identity of trusted
presenters to speak to these issues, and a means to permit members of the
audience to raise questions and provide feedback in a constructive way.95
The focus of these meetings would remain upon education, but it would
be education that demonstrates respect for the views and experience of
the people in the audience.
2. Formal Review and Comment
Sometimes a government agency that is making a decision about a
CAFO is required to offer the public an opportunity to submit written or
telephone comments about the proposed land use.9 6  However, no
requirement of a formal, in-person meeting exists. This process offers
some opportunity for voice in the decision-making process, in the form
of letters, e-mail correspondence, and voicemail messages. Thus, the
community is ostensibly given an opportunity to influence the decision-
making process but, in effect, usually knows little about whether or how
their input was considered. Thus, formal review and comment does not
generally provide the decision-maker with a procedural means of
demonstrating consideration, fairness, and even-handedness or respect
for the citizens providing input. While the possibility of acknowledging
and responding to all stakeholders' comments in a document that
explains the agency's final decision exists, this procedure is cumbersome
and rarely used. Consequently, formal review and comment may present
the greatest challenge to achieving a process that will be perceived as
procedurally just.
3. Formal Public Hearings
Government agencies are required by law to hold formal public
hearings at certain points in the process of siting CAFOs." Citizens have
the opportunity to present their views to government agencies at these
hearings. Although agencies are required to record and take these
comments into consideration when they make their decisions, they are
not obliged to agree with them.98 This procedure, like public information
meetings, can be structured either to enhance or hinder perceptions of
procedural justice. For example, the timing of public hearings is likely to
affect stakeholders' trust that their views will be considered in
95. See id. at 20-21, 25-29.
96. See e.g., id. at 67 (describing formal review and comment period as part of
process for approving individual permits under the Clean Water Act).
97. See e.g., id. at 56-74.
98. See Creighton, supra note 93 at 120-21.
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determining the final outcome. 99 Hearings that are held relatively early
in the decision-making process are likely to be perceived as granting
greater consideration.
Changes in format---e.g., traditional, 00 open house,toi or
roundtablel02-are also likely to affect stakeholders' perceptions of their
opportunity for voice, consideration, and treatment that is fair, even-
handed, and respectful. The open house and roundtable formats provide
an opportunity for real dialogue and even one-on-one education
regarding the complex legal and scientific issues involved. The
traditional format is less likely to foster real dialogue. 0 3
Agencies also can choose whether to use neutral facilitators to
manage the communication in public hearings.10 4 Again, this can affect
the potential for real dialogue. If public hearings are structured to permit
stakeholders to have voice and to demonstrate consideration, even-
handedness, and dignity, stakeholders are likely to be reassured that they
are valued members of the community who will exercise some influence
in the decision-making process. Decision-makers must, of course, avoid
conducting a proceedings that are, in reality, a mere sham.
B. Dispute Resolution Processes
1. Consensus Seeking Processes
In this procedure, an agency invites representatives of different
stakeholder groups or perspectives to join an advisory committee.'os
Members of the committee then search for areas on which they all agree
or can reach a "consensus." If the committee reaches a consensus, the
agency may make a decision that is consistent with the agreement or use
99. See id. at 11, 120-21.
100. Agency representatives generally sit at the front of the room and citizens take
turns speaking, sometimes into a microphone. The representatives may or may not
respond to the citizens' comments. The proceeding is recorded.
101. This is a more informal format, with agency representatives displaying relevant
information at various stations around the room. Citizens visit each station, study the
information, and provide comments to the agency representatives. The representatives
record the citizens' comments. See Creighton, supra note 93 at 161-62.
102. This is another informal format, with agency officials or facilitators sitting at
tables with eight to ten citizens. The official or facilitator at each table invites the
citizens to speak and records their comments on a flipchart. See Creighton, supra note 93
at 155-56.
103. See Michael Elliott, The Role of Facilitators, Mediators, and Other Consensus
Building Practitioners, in THE CONsENsus BUILDING HANDBOOK 216-18 (Lawrence
Susskind, Sarah McKeaman & Jennifer Thomas-Larmer eds., 1999).
104. See id. at 199-239; Creighton, supra note 93 at 195-97.
105. See Creighton, supra note 93 at 117-18, 163-73.
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parts of it. However, the agency may be required to consider other
information. Therefore, the agency is not required to adopt the precise
agreement recommended by the committee. 106 This procedure should
only be used, however, when the agency has agreed that it will be
significantly influenced by the committee's agreement. Otherwise, the
procedure may be considered a sham with the severe negative
consequences described earlier.
Consensus seeking processes, when managed appropriately, clearly
provide an opportunity for voice, consideration by decision-makers, and
treatment that is fair, even-handed, and respectful. They also offer an
opportunity for education regarding key issues and real dialogue with
other stakeholders, including the representatives of the sponsoring
agency.
In some circumstances, particularly when there is distrust of the
sponsoring agency or the agency concludes that it cannot behave in a
manner that will communicate openness and even-handed treatment of
various viewpoints, the agency would be wise to involve a neutral
facilitator. The characteristics and role of the facilitator, however, are
very important. That person will be required to behave in an effective
manner that demonstrates a commitment to even-handed treatment, as
well as a commitment to opportunities for voice, consideration, and
respect. In Pennsylvania, the interviews with stakeholders suggested that
the identity of and trust in the individual playing the role of the third
party should be a central process design consideration. 0 7 Pennsylvania
stakeholders' preference for facilitators who are knowledgeable
regarding CAFO-related disputes and will be responsible for educating
or advising the disputants also may present challenges to process design.
Indeed, this preference may suggest the need for a facilitator to find and
involve a team of trusted substantive experts, available to conduct an
early education session regarding legal or scientific issues and/or to be
available throughout the process to respond to stakeholders' questions.
Another option might be a facilitator team, with one person responsible
for guiding the process and the other(s) responsible for providing even-
handed, substantive information.
2. Mediation
In mediation, as in consensus seeking processes, representatives of
stakeholder groups and perspectives are invited to participate in
106. See id, at 118; Dwight Golann & Eric Van Loon, Legal Issues in Consensus
Building, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK 505-10 (Lawrence Susskind, Sarah
McKearnan & Jennifer Thomas-Larmer eds., 1999).
107. See ABDALLA ET AL., PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 4 at 36-37.
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discussions and to attempt to reach consensus on an issue. The agency
charged with legislative or administrative authority for the issue is also
represented in the process. This process is different from consensus
seeking processes, however, in one very important way. The
stakeholders involved in mediation together decide the resolution of the
- conflict or make a decision. The decision will be binding. Thus, the
responsible agency maintains control over the final decision, but shares
that control with the involved stakeholders.
Mediation always involves a third party, the mediator, who helps
the parties communicate and negotiate with each other to reach
resolution. This procedure, managed appropriately, provides an
opportunity for voice, consideration by those at the table, and treatment
that is fair, even-handed, and respectful. This process also provides an
opportunity for real dialogue. Finally, mediation provides all
stakeholders with direct, rather than indirect, control over the situation.
As with consensus seeking processes, however, if mediation is meant to
respond to concerns regarding procedural fairness, the selection of the
appropriate mediator is crucial. This individual or team must manage the
process in a manner that allows stakeholders to trust in the process, the
mediator(s), and the ultimate outcome.
C. A Continuum ofProcesses
As should be clear from their description, the five processes
recommended here respond to varying degrees to the different needs
identified in the interviews with Pennsylvania stakeholders. Public
information meetings, in particular, are meant to respond to perceptions
of risk and uncertainty by providing stakeholders with easy access to
relevant and accurate information regarding the relevant law, science,
and technology. To the extent that this procedure permits stakeholders to
have an opportunity for voice, the opportunity is designed primarily to
provide reassurance regarding stakeholders' social standing. Formal
review and comment, public hearings, and consensus seeking processes
respond most directly to stakeholders' search for an opportunity to
exercise indirect control through the opportunity for voice. Public
hearings and consensus seeking processes, unlike formal review and
comment, additionally have the potential to provide direct reassurance to
stakeholders that their voices and identities are valued. Mediation,
finally, is the one process that can provide to stakeholders an experience
of procedural justice, as well as direct, if shared, control over their
situation. Depending upon the situation and the needs of the
stakeholders, some of these processes can be combined or used in a
planned sequence.
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V. Conclusion
Making decisions regarding the regulation of CAFOs and other
CAFO-related disputes is undeniably difficult. Dispute resolution and
decision-making in this context requires consideration of complex and
often conflicting legal and scientific information. Some stakeholders'
perception of risk is very high. Public officials must weigh one citizen's
right to be assured of a safe and aesthetically pleasing environment
against another citizen's right to use his property for economic benefit or
even survival. Each of these citizens is raising a legitimate set of rights
and concerns. If these citizens can be permitted, through mediation, to
experience procedural justice and exercise direct control over the
resolution of their dispute, the outcome is most likely to provide some
advantage to both, to inspire their compliance, and to permit the
maintenance of a relationship.
Even if these citizens cannot be permitted to maintain direct control
over the final resolution of their dispute, however, they and their
communities (whether a local community, a region, or even a state) will
benefit from the use of decision-making processes that respond to the
yearning for procedural justice. In evaluating Pennsylvania
stakeholders' dissatisfaction with the processes that have been used or
are being used to address CAFO-related disputes, the extent to which
their dissatisfaction and perceived lack of control is grounded in
procedural justice concerns is striking. Citizens, as members of a
democracy, need to be able to believe that their voice counts and that
public decision-making offers them some level of indirect control over
decisions. Thus, if the public authorities responsible for making
decisions regarding CAFOs can focus as much on listening to and
considering the voice of the people affected by these disputes as they do
on the legal analysis and scientific studies that have been done, they may
be able to help communities, and the sense of shared control that
distinguishes a democracy, weather the consequences of the changing
face of agriculture.
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